We analyze geographic patterns of trade using transactions data from eBay and MercadoLibre, two large online auction sites. We find that distance continues to be an important deterrent to trade between geographically separated buyers and sellers, though at a lesser extent than has been observed in studies of non-Internet commerce. We also find a strong "home bias" towards trading with counterparties located in the same city.
I. Introduction
An extensive literature in international economics analyzes the impact of distance on trade flows. The stylized finding of a large numbers papers estimating the "gravity equation" is that trade volume among two countries increases with the size of their economies and decreases with the distance that separates the countries. A subset of these papers also report a very significant "border effect": controlling for distance, trade between two regions is much lower if the goods have to cross national borders. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) , in their recent review of this literature, point out transportation costs and tariffs/taxes as the main frictions contributing to the decline of trade flow with distance and the border effect. They also discuss a growing number of papers on "informational frictions." Such informational frictions include search costs, which hinder geographically distant buyers and sellers from finding each other; communication barriers, which hinder efficiency of negotiations 2 ; and, more generally, "contracting costs," driven by the inability to monitor and sanction misconduct of distant transacting parties. 3 With the rise of the Internet, the question arises of whether the institutional environment of online commerce alters the impact of distance on trade flows. This paper analyzes geographic patterns of trade on two large online auction sites, eBay and MercadoLibre.
eBay is the largest online auction site in the world, and our data is a representative sample of all eBay transactions conducted within the 48 continental U.S. states.
MercadoLibre is the largest online auction site in Latin America; we chose to study this site mainly to check the robustness of our results obtained using eBay data, but also to understand whether additional geographic barriers to trade arise in the context of a less developed set of economies. 2 Portes and Rey (2002) find a negative correlation between telephone traffic and bank presence and the distance effect. 3 Rauch and Trindade (2002) find that ethnic Chinese networks have increased bilateral trade flows between country pairs, and that in Southeast Asia, their effect is larger for differentiated products than for homogenous goods. Combes, Lafourcade and Mayer (2005) report that firm and immigrant networks are important facilitators of intra-France trade. Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) show that country-level indices of institutional quality are associated with trade flows.
The online auction environment provides an interesting and unique opportunity to study the distance-dependence of trade, as the environment can be considered "frictionless" in certain important dimensions. 4 First, search costs are practically nonexistent on these markets, since the computerized search interface matches buyers almost instantly with listings they might be interested in. Communication costs are also very low, given that most listings follow a fairly uniform format and language, and all transacting parties have access to e-mail for fast and reliable communication. As for shipping costs, a flat shipping fee is quoted by most eBay sellers for transactions within the continental U.S., largely equalizing this margin across different seller locations. 5 Note also that, within the continental U.S., tariffs are nonexistent, and sales taxes, which are imposed by the states,
should encourage out-of-state purchases as opposed to within state purchases.
Our main result is the following: even on eBay and MercadoLibre, distance has a strong negative effect on trade. This effect is highly non-linear, trading volume being abnormally high within the same city and abnormally low across country borders. Once beyond the driving distance of the city limits, the effect of distance on trade is relatively small between cities in the same state or country. Further results suggest that "trust" may be a significant contributor to the distance effect: we find that high ticket items (such as jewelry) have more difficulty crossing city limits, and that the "same city effect" is much more pronounced in those categories where the average seller reputation is lower. We also find some evidence that local tastes and item uniqueness have the opposite effect on the impact of distance on trade. The same city effect is strongest in location-specific items such as tickets or sports memorabilia, and weakest in scarce items with universal appeal such as collectible coins.
Our paper is a close complement to the work of Blum and Goldfarb (2005) , who analyze the web-surfing behavior of a panel of Internet users. They find that local tastes appear to be an important driver of digital goods consumption. Our work is distinct from Blum and Goldfarb's in that we focus on physical goods trade on eBay and MercadoLibre, rather than on digital/media goods. Some of our findings reinforce their message regarding the importance of local tastes, though other findings point to factors such as trust as being another source of the observed home-bias on the Internet. Our work also relates to Freund 6 -and that proximity may serve as a substitute for trust. Another potential implication of this finding is that the growth of online marketplaces may be limited by their ability to develop exchange-like clearing mechanisms that dissociate the flow of goods from the identity of market participants.
Simply reducing search costs by creating online databases of buyers and sellers will not lead to the frictionless growth of the network of buyers and sellers.
II. Theoretical Framework
To motivate the analysis we will use a simple auction model with an exogenously determined number of participants. The willingness of buyers to pay will depend on the characteristics of the good auctioned and the characteristics of the seller, including the buyer's geographical proximity to the seller. Higher willingness to pay will lead to higher probability of winning the auction. How distance among agents affects the willingness to pay will influence the probability of winning the auction, and therefore the number of transactions we should observe between agents from any pair of geographical locations.
Let's assume that in a certain auction there are S seller types and B buyer types. We will assume that a type is defined by the individual's geographical location, though it is easy to extend the concept of type to include other agent characteristics, such as reputation. In the auction N s sellers of type s and N b buyers of type b will participate. When a seller of type s puts an item up for sale, the willingness of a buyer of type b to pay for the item, bs υ , will be:
where γ is some fundamental value of the item auctioned, bs µ is the idiosyncratic valuation attached by buyer b to the item sold by seller s, and ε bs is an IID random disturbance. In its most simple interpretation, bs µ represents how the distance between the locations of seller s and buyer b affects the willingness to pay. For instance, it is intuitive to think that buyer b will reduce her valuation by the cost of transporting the item from the location of seller s location to her own location, or that she will factor in tax differentials among locations. bs µ may also be affected by the nature of the good being auctioned or the reputation of the seller. For instance, distance will have more impact on more valuable items or on less reputable sellers because the cost of a recourse action increases with remoteness.
If we assume that the auction mechanism is efficient-i.e., that it awards each good to the buyer with highest willingness to pay-, and that ε bs follows a Type-I extreme value distribution we can express the probability that a buyer of type b wins an auction in which the good is sold by a seller of type s as In the following section we describe the data used in the empirical analysis.
III. Data Sources
We developed this study with the data of two leading online auction sites: eBay, arguably the firm that invented the concept of online auctions, and the largest player in this industry; and MercadoLibre, leader of online auctions in Latin America. Online auction sites are well-suited for our study not only because these firms are interested in minimizing the impact of distance to increase the size of their networks, but also because For each pair of locations there is one observation for auction transactions and one for fixed price transactions. 10 The advantage of having all the transactions in the database eliminates any measurement error associated with the sampling procedure used with the eBay data, but comes at the price of not being able to get all the listing characteristics that might affect demand. Nevertheless, having the location information for all the buyers avoids the missing data problem of the eBay sample and allows the data obtained from
MercadoLibre to act as a robustness check of our analyses.
There are several reasons why these data sources are especially relevant not only for firms that try to expand their network of users but also for economists who try to understand the geography of trade, as they can help us to understand the sources of frictions that cause distance to have a negative impact in commercial activity. First of all, these marketplaces are pure intermediaries that facilitate trade in a variety of goods.
Thus, short of running a comprehensive census, focusing on these sites allows us to examine geographic trading patterns for a relatively large cross-section of product varieties, helping us to understand which product characteristics make trading more sensitive to distance. Second, one may argue that the main benefit of the Internet as a trade facilitator is to reduce search costs, and it is reasonable to think of these marketplaces as being essentially "frictionless" in this regard. Third, shipping and handling fees are often quoted explicitly by seller on these websites, and, for a wide class of goods, these fees apply uniformly to buyers of differing locations (at least within the same country). Thus, shipping cost differentials across locations are effectively controlled for (except for variation in the time-of-arrival dimension).
These features render eBay and MercadoLibre close approximations of the "unified marketplace" view of the Internet, though several caveats are in order. First, the products that are bought and sold through these site, although encompassing a large variety, are mainly new and used household durables, and thus extrapolations to other goods categories is not possible. Second, a similar "representativeness" criticism may also be leveled against the demographic characteristics of the users of these websites. However, one may apply the same criticisms to the Internet trade in general. At a minimum, our analyses may shed some light on what are the frictions behind the distance effect for goods and agents currently involved in Internet commerce, and provide hints on how to overcome these frictions.
IV. Results from Analyses Aggregated at the State/Province Level
In this section we analyze whether physical distance between buyer and seller reduces the intensity of Internet trade or not. If the online auction sites are able to eliminate the frictions that have been traditionally attributed to the distance effect, we should observe no difference in the purchasing behavior of buyers when the seller is close or faraway.
Specifically, in a regression framework based on equation ( (2000) and Hillberry and Hummels (2003) , who tested the impact of distance on interstate commerce in the U.S. using data from the Commodity Flow Survey of the U.S. Census. Both of these studies find a negative and significant effect of the distance variable. These studies also find a very significant "home-state bias" effect, as seen in the large coefficient estimate on a dummy for same state transactions, which suggests there are costs to trading across state borders that are not purely distance dependent.
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When we run the regression with eBay data, we obtain results that have a sign consistent with prior studies. In all the specifications of the regression, the coefficients on distance are negative and significant while the coefficients on the same state dummy are also significant but positive. These signs are robust whether we measure trade by the number of transactions -the specification that we derived theoretically in the prior section -or by the dollar value of the trade, and whether we use the raw distance between the buyer and seller state or its log.
When we compare our results to the models of reference we observe that the effect of distance in Internet trade is much smaller than in the Census data. The coefficients of distance in the eBay regressions are roughly one tenth of the magnitude of the coefficients in Wolf (2000) and Hillberry and Hummels (2003) . However, the coefficient on same state is of similar level -about ½ that of Wolf and the same level of Hillberry and Hummels. The combination of these two results seems to indicate that though eBay is fairly effective in mitigating the effect of distance in interstate commerce, a "home bias" still continues to exist.
The analyses using the MercadoLibre data support these findings. Table II shows the results of the analyses. In the first three models, distance is measured by the distance between country capitals; in the last three, by the distance between provincial capitals.
We observe a negative effect of distance that is attenuated by a very strong same country effect and a relatively strong same province effect. It is interesting to note from this analysis that the same country effect seems to be much stronger that the same province effect. This difference may just be caused by the customs barriers, but it may also be due to an amplification of the frictions manifested in the "same province" effect.
The question may arise of whether the same province effect is just a consequence of the larger number of buyers and sellers in the same states, particularly in states such as New York or California that concentrate a significant amount of traders. We also ran the same analyses excluding buyers and sellers from New York and California, obtaining essentially the same results as those reported here.
In summary, we find that the distance effect is present in both our samples. 
V. What Drives the "Same State" Effect on eBay?
In this section we analyze whether the distance effect observed in the prior section is explained by the same frictions that affect non-Internet trade, such as shipping costs, time zones, trust, or sales taxes. We will give special consideration to the possible reasons for the observed discontinuity at the state border.
The most evident trade friction is the cost of shipping, which is likely to increase with distance. Also, it is possible for transportation companies to have a two-tier pricing structure for interstate and intrastate transport, a disparity which is reflected in the shipping cost quoted by sellers and which would generate the same state effect. In the previous section we assumed that the flat shipping & handling cost usually quoted in eBay listings was the norm. In models I and II of Table III we relax this assumption by explicitly including the shipping cost in the regression framework. Shipping costs have the expected negative, and statistically significant, impact on trade activity, and they seem to be partially responsible for the distance effect, as the coefficient on the distance variable falls when shipping costs are included. However, this coefficient remains negative and significant, suggesting that shipping costs are only a partial explanation for the distance effect. Moreover, they do not seem to be behind the "home bias," as the coefficient of the same state dummy remains positive, significant, and at about the same level. including the electronic payment system Paypal, buyer protection, and a feedback system.
Several papers in the empirical industrial organization literature show that bidders reduce their willingness to pay when they observe certain levels of negative feedback. 13 If reputation is effective in mitigating the concerns of buyers for whom distance makes it difficult to exercise any recourse, we should observe that negative feedback generates a higher reduction in the willingness to pay of distant buyers. In table IV, we interact distance and the same state dummy with dummy variables that identify bad sellers (98-99% rating) and very bad sellers (<98% rating). 14 The significant coefficients in the interactions suggest that trust contributes to the effect of distance and the feedback system helps to mitigate, although not to completely eliminate, this effect. Furthermore, the impact of negative feedback is less visible within the same state (the positive coefficient on the interaction term suggests that sellers with bad reputations are more likely to find a buyer in the same state), which is consistent with an interpretation of the same state effect that attributes the higher intensity of intrastate commerce to an increased possibility of direct enforcement of the trade agreement.
Finally, taxes are often associated with geographic patterns of trade. Goolsbee (1999) shows that Internet purchases are partially driven by sales tax optimization. As a general rule, only intrastate Internet trade can be subject to sales tax. Thus, differences in the tax regime of the seller state should have no impact on trade except in the sense that when seller and buyer are in the same state they will be less likely to engage in trade, and even less likely if they are located in a state with a high sales tax. This would normally suggest a negative coefficient on the same state dummy, contrary to the evidence above.
However, if we were to have individual same state dummies for each state, it would be reasonable to expect a positive coefficient on the low-sales-tax-states' dummies. One may argue that the value of the coefficient may be affected by the undue influence of low or no sales tax states, though it is difficult to conceive how this could result in a positive coefficient on the same state dummy. Models II and III of Table IV provide no evidence of sales taxes causing the distance effect. As expected, none of the interactions between the dummies identifying the tax regimes of the sellers and distance is significant.
Moreover, when interacted with the same state dummy, coefficients do not monotonically increase as the sales tax rate falls, and even though the higher sales tax regime (absorbed in the intercept) has a negative, albeit insignificant, coefficient relative to the other regimes, it may be caused by the weight of California, an exception to the same state effect as we have seen above.
In summary, although shipping costs seem to deter Internet commerce between distant buyer and seller, it only explains partially the effect of distance observed in online trading. Moreover, trust seems to be the only variable that has some impact on the same state effect. This finding is consistent with the possibility of a direct recourse in case of breach of contract, which provides a strong incentive for agents to keep trading relationships within limited radius. The question then arises of whether state limits are the relevant distance for intense commerce or whether shorter radii, such as city limits or driving distance, are more important. We will address this concern in section VII.
VI. Cross-Country Evidence on Domestic Trade Frictions
The MercadoLibre data set provides us with the unique opportunity to study the crosscountry variation in domestic trade frictions. Recall that in Table II we found the presence of strong distance effect, and an even stronger "same province" effect in our MercadoLibre data. We now estimate the gravity equation for each of the countries where
MercadoLibre.com has an auction site. Results are presented in Table V . In these regressions we only consider the transactions completed between buyers and sellers of the same country.
We see that distance has an effect on trade that is consistently negative although not consistently significant across Latin America. On the other hand, the "same-province" effect is positive and strong throughout the region. Nevertheless, the strength of the same province effect varies across countries, ranging from a minimum coefficient of 1.3 in Argentina to the maximum of 2.1 in Ecuador. Values, on the other hand, were well above the 0.4-0.6 observed for the trade patterns in eBay USA.
We conjecture these differences may be due to differences in the level of economic development of these countries, to the institutional environment that protects/facilitates trade, or to cultural heterogeneity. With the natural caveat imposed by our limited sample of observations we illustrate these conjectures with the plots of the same province effect against variables measuring these factors (Figure 1 ). The first plot shows that the same province effect seems to be inversely related to GDP per capita. Of course, many economic mechanisms may lead to this apparent correlation and we do not want to ascribe any causal connection to this finding. One possible explanation, for example, could be the lack of a reliable and inexpensive postal and transportation system in poorer countries. Figure 1 shows that same province effect is higher in countries where the average seller's reputation has a larger percentage of negative comments, as measured by MercadoLibre's feedback system. 15 Some fear of expropriation maybe resolved through the use of credit cards, and, as plot 3 shows, the number of credit cards per inhabitant seems to be negatively correlated with the "same province effect." In the same vein, the quality of accounting standards in a country may be indicative of how successfully an economy has developed the institutions needed for the market to act as a coordinating mechanism among individuals. The relationship observed in plot 4 between the CIFAR (1995) scores and the same province effect supports the idea that higher quality accounting standards would correspond to more market-oriented economies in which trust mechanisms are better developed (Hope, 2003) and thus, the same province effect is lower. There is also some evidence that the "same province" effect maybe related to ethno-linguistic diversity within a country. Following Easterly and Levine (1997) we use the Atlas Narodov Mira (1964) index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization and, as shown by Plot 5 we find a direct relationship between the index and the same province effect.
A second explanation is a lack of trust and/or fear of expropriation, as indicated in Rauch and Trindade (2002) and Anderson and Marcoullier (2002). The second plot in
One explanation for this correlation maybe a lack of trust between different ethnolinguistic groups within the country; another maybe cultural and taste heterogeneity across different regions of the country.
Of course, all of these raw correlations are merely suggestive, as our small sample size prevents us from controlling for many obvious exogenous factors that may drive these patterns. Moreover, not all potentially relevant correlations are borne out in our data. 
VII. Results from Analyses Aggregated at the City Level
The existence of a strong positive "same state" or "same province" effect on intensity of
Internet commerce suggests the existence of a sort of "trading gravity field" within which the intensity of transactional activity is much greater than outside. Whether state borders or other milestones determine the reach of the attraction field is an empirical question. In principle, we may hypothesize that the city limits, the county line, or a specific travel length are justifiable alternatives to the state border. To further explore this question we exploit the fact that our eBay dataset contains the location of all buyers and sellers in the sample. 16 To identify the point of discontinuity in the distance effect more precisely, we run a regression of the log of dollar value of trade between two cities on a series of dummy variables that take the value of 1 if the distance between buyer and seller is within a 16 Unfortunately the MercadoLibre dataset was provided to us aggregated at the province level.
certain interval: a same city dummy and seller, and buyer city fixed effects. We graph the coefficients of the distance dummy variables in Figure 2 . It is remarkable to observe how the coefficients for all the distance intervals have similar levels and decrease smoothly as the distance increases, whereas the same city coefficient is about eight times the other coefficients. This result suggests that contrary to what one would expect, "driving distance" is relevant for commerce in the Internet. In theory, the Internet would enable markets to extend their reach almost limitlessly, and even if that benefit is partially observed for all other levels of distance, the city limits seem to represent an important barrier to trade.
In section V we found that the same state effect was at least partially caused by direct We then regress the category specific coefficients of the same city dummies on the percentage of negative feedback in the median seller record and on the average weight and price of an item in the category. Table V presents the results of the regression.
Despite the potential attenuation bias caused by an estimated dependent variable, we observe a positive and significant effect of both the reputation measure and the average price in the category. An interpretation of these results is that as the likelihood of a breach of contract increases (the seller has a more negative reputation), or as the cost of such a breach (value of the item) increases, it is more important to have the possibility of a direct enforcement mechanism, measured by proximity in the same city effect. In contrast, the coefficient on weight is insignificant, albeit negative, suggesting that shipping costs, usually a function of weight, are not determinant of the same city effect.
In summary, the results in this section support the hypothesis that despite the facilitation of search provided by the Internet, the city limits or "driving distance" cause an "attraction field" that concentrates an excessive amount of trade within them. Cultural factors and the possibility of a direct enforcement action in case of breach of contract determine the existence/need of a local market even in the Internet space.
VIII. Shill Bidding
One of the strategies employed by eBay sellers to raise their selling price is to use a different screen name (alias) to bid on their own items, thereby forcing other buyers to raise their bids. This practice, known as shilling, could be responsible for the geographic patterns of trade if (1) sellers won an extraordinary number of auctions; (2) sellers' alternative aliases were registered in the same city; and (3) in the case of the eBay data, sellers used all screen names for both buying and selling items. However, the three conditions do not seem very plausible: (1) if sellers won many auctions it would make the practice of shilling very expensive; (2) as being identified as a seller who shills would lead to negative feedback and, potentially, exclusion from the eBay community, sellers may try to hide their identity by registering their alternative alias in a different city; and (3) as the number of feedback comments is an element of reputation, it is optimal for sellers to concentrate their activity in a single account. Moreover, we find that the gravity equation regression reveals a strong same city and distance effect when we restrict our analyses to transactions conducted using a fixed, buy-it-now price, which are not subject to shilling activities. This finding provides additional evidence that our results cannot be explained by shilling.
IX. Conclusion
In this paper we analyze whether online auction sites have been able to create a virtual market in which the physical distance between buyer and seller becomes irrelevant.
Using transactions data from two Internet auction platforms (eBay and MercadoLibre) we find that even though geographical distance is less of a deterrent to trade than it has been observed in studies of non-Internet commerce, faraway buyers are still less likely to engage in a purchase agreement than closer ones. Furthermore, the geographical limits of a city, which we call driving distance, act as a field of attraction for transactions, so there is an abnormal concentration of commerce among buyers and sellers in the same city.
Further analyses suggest that cultural factors and the possibility of direct contract enforcement in case of breach are the main reasons behind the distance effect. The higher the likelihood of a breach (suggested by bad reputation of the seller), and the higher the cost of such a breach (more expensive items), the less likely a transaction between distant agents will take place. Also, very location-specific items such as tickets and baseball cards tend to be traded in local markets. Shipping costs, at least for intrastate U.S. trade, lightly deter distant trade, but their influence is too small to explain the bulk of the distance effect. 1-3 by the log of the number of transactions between state s (seller) and state b (buyer) while in models 4 and 5 it is measured by the log of the dollar value of these transactions. We measure distance as the great-circle distance between state capitals. For intrastate distances we use Wolf's (2000) formula, which utilizes the (population weighted) distance between the two most populous cities within a state. SAME_STATE is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if buyer and seller are located in the same state and 0 otherwise. The total number of transactions with state sellers or buyers proxies for the size of the economy. Models VI and VII are included for comparison purposes and present the results of Wolf (2000) and Hillberry and Hummels (2003) . All coefficients are significant at the 1% level. between country/province s (seller) and country/province b (buyer). For models 1-3 the geography unit is the country while in models 4-6 is the province. We measure distance as the great-circle distance between state capitals. For intrastate distances we use Wolf's (2000) formula, which utilizes the (population weighted) distance between the two most populous cities within a state. SAME COUNTRY is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if buyer and seller are located in the same country and 0 otherwise. SAME PROVINCE is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if buyer and seller are located in the same province and 0 otherwise. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
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